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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the way in which a grammar must account for the speaker's knowledge of sentence force as opposed to sentence form or meaning and the way in which this force is related to a sentence. According to the performative analysis approach, the force of each sentence should be stated explicitly as a part of the underlying representation of that sentence. After consideration and rejection of performative analysis, the author suggests an approach which states that sentence force is a function of sentence meaning, analogous to the work in semantics showing that sentence meaning is a function of constituent meaning and sentence form. Three types of relationships between sentence meaning and sentence form (explicit, underdetermined, and idiomatic) are described along with examples of each. A list of references is included. (VM)

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Sentences and Illocutionary Forces*

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1. Introduction

The native speaker of English knows that a sentence like (1-1)

(1-1) John may leave now.

standardly counts as a simple prediction of the future, a report of John's freedom of movement, or the giving of permission -- to name three of the most likely ways in which the sentence can be used.[1] He also knows that this sentence is not standardly taken to have the force of a plea, a request for information, or an oath, although the circumstances in which the sentence is uttered might permit these latter interpretations. I take this knowledge to be a part of the linguistic competence of the native speaker and, thus properly included within the domain of a grammar. In this paper I will be concerned first with how the pairing of a sentence with its illocutionary force(s) fits into a grammar and second with the principles which relate a sentence and its force(s).[2]

In the following discussion we will be talking about sentences, not utterances. A sentence, a construct with linguistic

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theory, has standard ways in which it can be used, e.g., to make a promise, make a plea, etc. We will not be talking about utterances: using sentences to communicate. Thus, we are not concerned with how a sentence HAS been used, was INTENDED to be used, was TAKEN by the hearer, and so forth. In addition, although the term conventional use (standard use) is a technical term, I have no adequate definition for it and will rely on the reader's intuitions. To pick an extreme case, sentence (1-2)

(1-2) Harry is ill.

is standardly used to make a statement, give a report, or make a warning, but is certainly not conventionally used as an example of a three-word sentence. On the other hand, the sentence

(1-3) I promise I'll find you.

has the superficial appearance of a promise; one might want to argue that it is conventionally used as a threat as well. Perhaps so. What is important is not if this or other instances appear to violate linguistic conventions, such as a verb used performatively denoting the illocutionary act the sentence can count as, but rather, what we take to be the conventional use(s) of the sentence and how this is to be accounted for.

I will be addressing two main questions in the course of the paper. The first is the way in which the pairing between a sentence and its force(s) fits into a grammar. In section 2, we examine and reject the Performative Analysis (PA), a position which holds that the conventional use of a sentence is stated explicitly as part of the underlying representation of the sentence, where the pairing is accounted for by the generative rules

of the grammar. In this analysis the illocutionary force indicator is always a highest performative verb.

In section 3 we propose an alternate approach in which conventional force is taken to be a function of sentence meaning and linguistic conditions on illocutionary acts. In discussing this approach we show that the relationship between meaning and force is often not explicit and requires a variety of interpretive principles. In section 4 we summarize the discussion.

2. The Performative Analysis

2.1 Statement of the Performative Analysis

The most widely known and detailed attempt to pair a sentence with its force is the effort which I will refer to as the Performative Analysis (PA). Based primarily on some ideas presented in Austin (1962) and elaborated in greatest detail and most carefully by Ross (1970), the major thrust of the PA is that the force of each sentence should be stated explicitly as a part of the underlying representation of that sentence. The PA asserts that sentence force should be carried by a single performative verb present in the highest clause of the sentence, and that this highest clause can, under certain syntactically-statable conditions, be deleted. It is argued, for example, that (2-1) has (2-2) underlying it and that a Performative Deletion Rule deletes all but the embedded S.

(2-1) Prices slumped.

(2-2) $_S[\ \underline{I}\text{-} \begin{bmatrix} +V \\ +Performative \\ +Communication \\ +Linguistic \\ +Declarative \end{bmatrix} - \underline{you} - [_S \underline{prices}\ \underline{slumped}]_S]_S$

Aside from the problems of the PA statement and its justification, points to be taken up in §2.2, there are a couple of important implications which follow from the adoption of the PA.

First, sentences like

(2-3) i) I promise you that I will be home at 5 o'clock.
ii) I will be home at 5 o'clock.

both have the force of a promise: the first only that force, standardly, and the second, that force among others. I maintain that the sentences differ in meaning: (2-3i) means that the speaker undertakes an obligation to be home, at 5 o'clock; (2-3ii), on the other hand, lacks the sense of obligation as a part of its meaning. In using the sentence (2-3ii) to make a promise (a possible use), the speaker assumes the obligation; but this obligation is not part of the 'meaning' of the sentence (2-3ii). The PA precludes this position. Since the PA claims that (roughly) (2-3i) underlies (2-3ii), and accepts that transformations are meaning preserving, deriving the abbreviated sentence from the fuller form requires meaning preservation. To support the PA, one must maintain that the examples in (2-3) and similar cases have identical meaning. Moreover, one is forced to maintain that transformations delete meaning-carrying lexical items, for there is certainly nothing in I or will, etc., that carries the sense of speaker obligation to carry out the action specified by the

following verb phrase.

Second, since the underlying representation is defined as the level at which the force of the sentence is determined, it follows that force ambiguity of a particular sentence is disambiguated at the underlying level. For example, in terms of the PA, (2-3ii) has three underlying representations:

(2-4) i) I predict
ii) I warn you
iii) I promise you } that I will be there on time.

2.2 Critique of the Performative Analysis

In this section I want to examine the PA as presented by Ross (1970) in some detail, to see just how well it stands up when pushed. At issue is both the accuracy of the overall statement of the PA and the syntactic evidence which has been adduced to support it.

2.2.1 Problems of the General Approach

The PA maintains that

(2-5) every deep structure contains one and only one performative sentence as its highest clause (Ross, Ibid., p. 261)

There are two different claims: first, that every sentence has only a single performative verb associated with it which (verb) specifies the force of the sentence. And second, that this verb is in the topmost clause of the sentence's underlying representation. I will examine the second of these claims first.

Note that the sentences

(2-6) i) I regret that I must inform you of your dismissal.
ii) I am pleased to be able to offer you the job.
iii) Let me point out that I admit you're right.
iv) I would like to congratulate you.

can be taken as a statement of a regret, an offer, an admission and a congratulation, respectively, even though the performative verb is embedded and is not the highest verb as required by Ross

(2-7) "All declarative sentences occurring in contexts where first person pronouns can appear derive from deep structures containing one and only one superordinate performative clause whose main verb is a verb of saying." (p. 259)

Regret and point out may be verbs of saying; please and like are not. In fact, examples such as those in (2-6) run counter to the claim that "there is an independently necessary constraint that prohibits any verb from having a performative interpretation when it is embedded as the complement of another verb." (p. 251) I doubt that evidence can be found to argue that in (2-6) the sentence-initial material is not at the highest level.

Sentences with -ly adverbs form one class of counterexamples to the highest verb claim.

(2-8) i) Obviously I concede that I've lost the election.
ii) It is obvious that I concede that I've lost the election.
iii) It - that S - is obvious.

The argument usually runs that (2-8i) has been derived by an optional rule from an earlier sentence like (2-8ii) which, in turn, has been derived from (2-8iii). But now compare (2-8i) and (2-9).

(2-9) I concede that it is obvious that I've lost the election.

In (2-9) the speaker concedes that the fact that he lost the

election is obvious -- he is conceding the obviousness of his defeat, whereas in (2-8i), the speaker concedes that he has been defeated, and then makes a clarifying comment about the appropriateness to make this concession. The obviously in the (2-8i) case is not within the scope of the concession and thus any argument that it began embedded under concede in the underlying representation is highly suspect. Yet concede determines the force in (2-8i).

There are two additional points with respect to these examples. First, it is not clear to me that (2-8i) and (2-8ii) have the same meaning. In fact, I question whether examples like (2-8ii) are acceptable at all. But if they are, I strongly doubt if their utterance constitutes a concession, but more likely a report of what the speaker habitually does. And second, when the obvious is inside the scope of the performative verb as in (2-9), the rule relating it is obvious and obviously cannot apply, for it will produce cases like

(2-10) *I concede that obviously I've lost the election.

Although I don't know the conditions under which a performative verb may be embedded and still retain its force, it is clear that the performative verb is not always on top. Thus, the simplicity of the PA whereby the highest verb always carries the force of the sentence must be abandoned.

We now turn to the contention that a sentence has one and only one performative verb which specifies its force. We noted above that sentence (1-1) had more than one illocutionary force: it was force-ambiguous. At issue here is force-multiplicity:

where the sentence force is a composite of two or more distinct forces. The speaker in uttering such a sentence under the appropriate conditions would be performing more than one illocutionary act. Force-multiplicity is direct counterevidence to the PA claim of one sentence-one force. We now consider a number of cases.

The first involves sentences in which there are two verbs, both of which are being used performatively.

(2-11) i) I admit that I concede the election.
ii) I announce that I hereby promise to be timely.
iii) I insist that I dare you to leave now.

Sentence (2-11i) is simultaneously an admission and a concession, (2-11ii) an act of announcing and promising, and (2-11iii) an act of insisting and daring. What should be posited is the highest performative verb, for example, in (2-11): admit or concede? Certainly not concede, so then admit? But then, how is the concession force of the sentence to be determined? One alternative would be to define a procedure for searching around in a sentence to determine if there is more than one operational performative verb. But if this is chosen, then the entire highest single performative verb claim must be abandoned. A second alternative would be to posit abstract verbs, for example a verb of admission/concession for (2-11i), which would function as the highest performative verb. But I seriously doubt that even the staunchest defenders of the PA would fall back on such a device.

A second sentence type with force-multiplicity is illustrated by the following examples.

(2-12) i) I promise that I will be there
ii) I admit that I did it.

Promising entails predicting; admitting entails asserting. That is, by virtue of the meaning of promise and admit and their performative use, the sentence commits the speaker to performing the act of predicting and asserting as well. A taxonomy of the linguistic conditions on illocutionary acts (Cf. section 4) will indicate the range and complexity of such force entailment. If the PA is embedded into a linguistic theory (e.g., Generative Semantics) in which all semantic relations, save the most primitive ones, are all spelled out in the underlying representation, then such force entailment will also be spelled out as well. The result: there will be more than one verb functioning performatively in such sentences. The PA embedded into an Aspects type theory will not be troubled by such examples.

A third type concern verbs discussed by Austin (1962) because they appeared to fail as pure performatives. Austin argued that verbs like agree, approve, blame, am sorry and others could be used performatively and descriptively as well.

(2-13) i) I agree that John should go home.
ii) I blame you for his injury.

Austin questioned if the speaker is performing the illocutionary act of agreeing in uttering (2-13i) or describing his attitude. Similarly, is the speaker blaming the hearer by virtue of uttering (2-13ii) or only describing his state? I suggest that the issue is not either/or but that these constitute another type of force-multiplicity. Austin never discussed this possibility, and I

don't know how he would view this conclusion.

The fourth type involves sentences like

(2-14) i) Why are we stopping here?
ii) Must you do that now?

which, I contend, have both the force of a request for information and an expression of negative opinion. Contrary to what others have argued (Lakoff, 1971) I don't view these two forces as two legs of a force-ambiguity but as force-multiplicity. I don't know of any good test to distinguish ambiguity from multiplicity. A rough heuristic is to determine whether the hearer can respond in such a way to reflect his awareness of both forces. Thus, to (2-14i) the hearer might answer "Because I'm hungry and I make the decisions." It may be that most if not all sentences carry some indication of the psychological state of the speaker as an expression of belief, attitude, and so forth. If so, then the examples like (2-14) are rather trivial cases of force-multiplicity, albeit still counterevidence to the PA claim of a single highest performative verb.

A fifth type (suggested by Ross, personal communication) concerns sentences with appositive relative clauses.

(2-14)' i) Did Mary, who is friendly, ever arrive?
ii) Have you seen Max, who is quietly chewing away?

Each example clearly has the force of a request for information but also seems to have the force of an assertion. If by uttering (2-14i)', for example, the speaker is both asking about Mary's arrival <u>and</u> asserting that Mary is friendly, we have another instance of force-multiplicity.

Conjoined cases such as those in (2-15) exhibit counterexamples to both parts of (2-5).

(2-15) i) I admit that I'm late, and I promise that I will be on time from now on.
ii) I wish he were here, but I authorize you to do it anyway.
iii) Be careful of the road, and call me when you arrive.
iv) Why wash your car, since it's going to rain tomorrow.

The speaker of these sentences can be taken to be performing more than one type of speech act. In (2-15i) he is both admitting and promising; in (2-15ii), he is wishing and authorizing; in (2-15iii) he is issuing a warning and giving an order; and in (2-15iv) he is making a suggestion and making a prediction. What

is to be the highest single performative verb? Perhaps there is none. Certainly neither of the verbs denoting the force of each half of the conjoined sentence can seriously be considered as the highest performative verb. Perhaps some super-high verb, e.g., of saying in (2-15i) and (2-15ii) and of requesting in (2-15iii)? I don't know what it would be in (2-15iv). The PA is intended to apply to all sentences, particularly declaratives for which the analysis was worked out in detail. We must conclude that either the single highest verb analysis must be rejected, or that conjoined sentences are not dominated by a single S. The latter conclusion runs counter to all evidence I know of concerning conjoined sentences.[3]

Finally, there are difficulties with the actual statement of the Performative Deletion. Ross (ibid) wrote that

> at present, it is not clear to me how this rule is to be generalized sufficiently to handle this class of cases [the declaratives] but still kept specific enough so that performative verbs like authorize and grant will not be deleted. Perhaps no general condition is statable, and verbs must be lexically marked as to whether or not they undergo this rule. (p. 249)

Having examined this rule in some detail, I can only agree with his premonition that its generality is limited. We now look at a number of difficulties the rule faces, both in simply accounting for the declarative examples, the subject of Ross' paper, and the other types of speech acts in general. In all cases, we will consider examples in which there is an embedded S which can stand as a well-formed

utterance alone, and will ignore cases such as "I hereby veto this bill" and "I now appoint you the Chairman" for which the rule was never intended.

Ross briefly considers whether the rule should be optional or obligatory and, on the basis of sentences like (2-16) due to McCawley, suggests that the rule should be sensitive to hereby and should be obligatory when hereby occurs with verbs like tell.

(2-16) i) I tell you that prices slumped.
ii) *I hereby tell you that prices slumped.

But consider the examples in (2-17).

(2-17) i) I even claim that John will win tomorrow.
ii) I strongly agree that Suzan is the best.
iii) I only admit that I am not with the FBI.

These sentences can be taken as a claim, an agreement, and an admission, respectively, but the higher performative clause cannot be deleted. The sentences in (2-17) do not have the same force as the corresponding ones in (2-18).

(2-18) i) Even John will win tomorrow.
ii) *Strongly Suzan is the best.
iii) Only I am not with the FBI.

The speaker of (2-17i) claims many things, and surprisingly, claims that John will win tomorrow; the speaker of (2-18i) claims that many people will win tomorrow, surprisingly John. (2-18ii) is simply not grammatical. And in (2-17iii), the speaker admits only one thing: that he is not with the FBI; in (2-18iii), he admits that he is the only one that is not with the FBI. The performative deletion rule is intended to preserve meaning and force. The examples in (2-17) and (2-18) are not synonymous and it follows that the rule must be blocked for such cases.

A second instance of non-applicability of the rule is illustrated by examples in (2-19).

(2-19) i) I approve that you took the dog to the Vet.
ii) I apologize that we are late.
iii) I beg that we leave now.
iv) I move that he should be allowed to decide.

The embedded S "You took the dog to the Vet" does not have the force of approving, nor "We are late" that of apologizing. "We leave now" is not standardly begging, and "He should be allowed to decide" is hardly a move at a meeting. Conclusion: with some verbs, (e.g., approve, apologize, beg, move) the rule of performative deletion may not apply.

On the other hand, there are numerous cases in which the rule must apply if the sentence is to be well-formed. The first sort of case is illustrated in (2-20).

(2-20) i) I offer do you want to go home.
ii) I request can you pass me the salt.
iii) I recommend that you should stay here.
iv) I authorize you that you may buy some butter.
v) I urge you that you ought to take this piece of pie.
vi) I thank you that I am grateful for this attention.

Each of the examples use the force denoted by the initial performative verb (offer, request, etc.), but in each case, the Performative Deletion Rule must obligatorily apply.

A second class of cases are those illustrated in (2-21)

(2-21) i) *I threaten that I will kill you.
ii) *I plead that you will spare his life.
iii) *I boast that I have done that.

where the highest verb (threaten, plea, boast) can never be used performatively, even though the embedded clause can be taken, respectively, as a threat, a plea, and a boast.

To summarize, I think it is clear that i) even when a verb is used performatively, it need not be the highest verb in the underlying representation or the surface structure; ii) that there are a variety of cases of force-multiplicity of the sentence and there is no single verb, performative or otherwise, which can account for the total force; and iii)that the rule of Performative Deletion Rule, when pushed to handle a wide range of declarative sentences and other types of speech acts as well, appears to require a highly complicated state of conditions. It is not the simple generalization initially proposed. Ross (p. 249) foresaw such complications; this complication of the rule should not be taken as a criticism of his work, but confirmation of his fears.

2.3.2 Problems of Syntactic Justification

We turn now to the syntactic justification presented in support of the PA. In his paper Ross (ibid) presents fourteen arguments to support his main thesis that a sentence such as (2-22i) is derived from (2-22ii).

(2-22) i) Prices slumped

ii) $_S[\underline{I}\ \begin{bmatrix}+V\\+Performative\\+communication\\+linguistic\\+declarative\end{bmatrix}\ \underline{you}\ {}_S[\text{Prices slumped}]_S]_S$

Seven of the arguments are in support of the postulating a highest subject I, three in support of a highest declarative performative verb denoting linguistic communication (e.g., say, tell, claim, argue, agree), and three arguments in support of a highest indirect

object you. One final argument is separate from the others.

The arguments to support the PA all take the following general form:

(2-23) i) Syntactic facts involving embedded sentences are presented.
ii) It is asserted that these facts can be accounted for by relating them to constituents in the dominating sentence.
iii) Corresponding facts are shown to occur in simple declarative sentences.
iv) It is concluded that the facts in the simple declarative sentences can be accounted for only by adopting the constituent of the performative clause being argued.

I will not examine in detail all 14 of the arguments. This has been done elsewhere (Fraser, 1970a). However, I do want to examine several of them to show:

(2-24) i) That the generalization claimed for the embedded sentence can be shown to be either too restrictive or just simply false.
ii) That, when relevant, performative sentences themselves exhibit the very same syntactic phenomena claimed for declaratives.

Showing the evidence to be inaccurate or incomplete may or may not constitute serious counter-evidence for the syntactic justification of a particular argument. In each case, one will have to decide if the complete evidence, when stated, is in consonance with the PA. However, the second point is crucial since the PA is now on the horns of a dilemma: either one must argue that performative sentences themselves are embedded into a performative sentence, where the highest verb will have no illocutionary force, or argue that the syntactic facts in performative sentences are different from those in simple declarative sentences.[4]

The first four arguments, all tokens of the same type, involve the distribution of the emphatic reflexive pronoun in English.[5] In particular, Ross claims that the following generalization is the major one governing the rule that produces emphatic reflexives.

(2-25) If an anaphoric pronoun precedes an emphatic reflexive, (e.g., him himself), the former may be deleted if it is commanded by the NP with which it stands in an anaphoric relationship. (p. 227)

He concludes that the acceptability of sentences like

(2-26) This paper was written by Ann and myself. (R 21a)

but the unacceptability of the same sentence with a third person reflexive pronoun (e.g. himself) can be accounted for by positing a higher subject, I, later deleted by the Performative Deletion Rule. If (2-26) has an underlying representation "I say to you that Ann and I wrote this paper" then the acceptable myself but unacceptable himself follows by the convention stated in (2-25). Nothing turns on whether the reflexive refers to a higher subject or object, but only that the subject or object command the ERP. I take no issue with Ross' claim that if there is a higher sentence, these ERPs are normally predictable. It is worthwhile asking, however, whether these are the only conditions for their occurrence.

Notice first that there are cases where ERPs have no referent from which the morphological shape is derivable in any obvious way.

(2-27) i) I agree (with you) that the letter should have been written by Harry and ourselves.
ii) We question if the job should be finished by Jones and myself.

iii) The Chair acknowledges that the question was directed at the Secretary and myself.
iv) Counsel moves that the jury be selected by the defense lawyer and yourself.

In (2-27i) the ourselves can refer to either and I and you, taken as a group, or to the I and some other group of people whose identity is understood from the context. (2-27ii) shows the speaker representing a group but later referring to only himself. The Chair is clearly co-referential with the speaker in (2-27iii) but the acceptability of the example turns on the speaker's awareness that chairmen as well as mayors, senators, etc. use their titles in speaking in the first person. Finally, the performative verb move never occurs with the indirect object you though it does permit the vocative indirect object as in "I move, Mr. Chairman, that..." where the Mr. Chairman takes yourself as the ERP form. The point is this: far more is going on in terms of the ERPs of the embedded sentence than can be predicted from a simple PA. The I-say-to you paradigm appears to account for only part of the facts.

A second difficulty with the PA follows from the fact that an ERP need not have a commanding antecedent NP nor must the antecedent even occur in the same sentence.

(2-28) i) Was the paper which John mentioned finally written by just Mary and himself?
ii) Since the people who he expected yesterday haven't arrived yet, the work can't be completed by only Sue and himself.
iii) After arguing with him for two hours, I've finally gotten Jones to give in. The job will be pulled by Smith and himself tomorrow afternoon.
iv) Mary was furious about the bill she got. So, since the whole house had been painted just by John and herself, the contractor decided that he would lower the price.

v) Mary rued the day she ever took the job. There was never any help available and everything had to be done all by herself.

In (2-28i-ii) the antecedent occurs before the ERP but in neither case does it command it. For (2-28iii-iv) the ERP clearly refers to an NP in an earlier sentence. Of course, the question remains as to whether one would posit for (2-28iii) a structure of the sort "I say to you that Jones says to me that the job..." Perhaps, but this goes well beyond the PA. The point is that ERPs don't come from <u>just</u> higher sentences although under some conditions they <u>may</u>.

Finally, and crucially, we find performative sentences which exhibit ERPs as in (2-29).

(2-29) i) You are hereby authorized by John and myself to buy that ship.
ii) You are hereby advised by Mary and myself that we are married.
iii) The court rejects any such remarks directed at the other jurors and myself.

But if these are performatives -- and they most certainly are -- then they cannot, by definition, be embedded in another performative. The PA requires that the performative verb be always at the top level. Where, then, does the ERP come from here? Clearly not from a higher sentence. Perhaps a lower (deleted) sentence; but this also contradicts Ross' claim. These facts strike me as the strongest type of syntactic counterevidence to Ross' main thesis of higher performatives underlying declarative sentences, since the facts he adduces are found in performatives and cannot be accounted for. The same sorts of counterevidence can be brought

for the other four cases of ERPs presented by Ross in 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.3.3.

As a second type of argument in support of a higher I, Ross suggests as a first approximation to exclude sentences like

(2-30) i) ??It was given by me to your sister. (R37a)
ii) ??Tom thinks that it was given by him to your sister.(R38)
iii) ??Sue was expected by Max to wash him. (R40b)

that the following condition holds:

(2-31) If a deep structure NP and some other NP in the deep structure are co-referential, then the former NP may not become a passive agent. (R41)

It is argued that the examples in (2-30) are excluded because there was a higher S which includes I as its subject NP.

I suggest that the sentences, if unacceptable, are out because of stress considerations, not because of two co-referential NP's. Sentence final position is normally the intonation center and pronouns, unless emphatically stressed, do not take primary stress. Notice the unacceptability of a sentence like

(2-32) *A large shock was given by it to my sister.

where the it refers to a live wire, etc. But this deep structure doesn't violate condition (2-31).

Moreover, a different order of constituents often results in an acceptable sentence.

(2-33) What happened to your sister? Oh, she was given a black eye by me although it was totally unintentional.

In addition, stressing the pronoun produces an acceptable sentence.

(2-34) It won't be given by ME to your sister.

And finally, why not rule out the sentence

(2-35) It was given by you to your sister

since the PA requires a higher you? I don't think the examples here really bear on the issue at all.

A third type of evidence presented to support a higher sentence subject I turns on the infelicity of sentences like those in (2-36) where the verb lurk co-occurs with I as the subject in simple declarative sentences.

(2-36) i) ?*I am lurking in a culvert. (R43a)
ii) Max believes that I am lurking in a culvert. (R44a)

Ross claims that a verb like lurk must be constrained so that it does not appear in a deep structure in which its (lurk's) subject is co-referential with the subject of the next sentence higher.

But as Ross acknowledges (footnote 27) the constraints on lurk are not well understood. A higher sentence object does not preclude acceptable lurk sentences, e.g.,

(2-37) i) Tom told me that I was lurking in the alley.
ii) I've been informed that I lurked in the bushes last night.

Moreover, it is clear that the constraint on lurk is not a subject restriction.

(2-38) i) I deny that I lurked near your house last night.
ii) I admit that I'm lurking near your wife.
iii) The fact that I am lurking in the bushes should'nt bother you.
iv) I declare that I am not lurking in the alley.

Notice also that (2-38) are performative sentences.

Harnish has suggested (personal communication) that the correct use of the verb lurk implies that the person performing the action of lurking is doing so unobserved. Sentences such as (2-39i) are perfectly acceptable, while (2-39ii) is at least questionable because it is announcing to someone his intention to carry out an act which, to perform, the speaker must assume he is doing unobserved.

(2-39) i) I was lurking near City Hall last night and saw the Mayor smoking grass.
ii) I will lurk near your yard tomorrow.

A final argument for a higher I involves the phrase according to NP. The claim is made that first person NP's may not appear in the phrase following according to in simple declarative sentences. Thus, according to Ross, sentences such as

(2-40) i) *According to me, food prices will skyrocket.
ii) *According to us, I should be punished.

are excluded by the following condition:

(2-41) No well-formed deep structure may contain an embedded according to-phrase if the NP in that phrase is identical to any NP belonging to the first sentence above the one containing that phrase. (R49)

But the following sentences violate the condition stated in (2-41).

(2-42) i) According to you, we all should be doomed.
ii) I concede (declare) that according to me, the U.S. has no foreign policy.
iii) I admit that according to you, McCarthy would make a great President.
iv) Jones didn't hear it from Mary that according to her we all have insanity.
v) Don't deny that according to you, all imperatives have an underlying you.

And notice again that (2-42) are performatives.

The next section contains three arguments to support the claim that declarative sentences have a higher deep structure verb like say (the bundle of syntactic features in (2-22i). The first argument depends on the claim that the verb believe can have a human object NP in case a higher sentence has a co-referential subject for a verb of linguistic communication. This claim is reflected by the following example.

(2-43) Tom told her that Ann could swim but nobody believed
i) *them
ii) *her
iii) him

The final him in (2-43iii) appears to be a reduction of something like what he told. One doesn't believe John in the sense of one hits John; rather, John communicates some information which is either believed or not. If the information is believed, then we can say that John is believed. It is not surprising that verbs of linguistic communication are involved here. Ross then claims that the acceptability of a sentence like

(2-44) Ann can swim, but if you don't believe me, just watch her.

is accounted for by the PA. However, as Ross acknowledges, there are higher verbs whose object is the antecedent for the believe object and there are non-linguistic communication verbs which permit a human object to follow believe:

(2-45) i) They listened to the story from John but nobody believed him.
ii) The people received the truth from Harry but only Mary believed him.
iii) The expert ridiculed our testimony and consequently the jury wouldn't believe us.
iv) Jones made it plain that Harry would come home but I didn't believe him.
v) Johnson is so stupid that I simply cannot believe him.
vi) We are in such a mess because of Rusk that I will not believe him this time.

The point: the conditions for the position of the anaphoric reference is much wider than suggested in Ross' discussion.

It appears that the human objects for believe can be accounted for without recourse to the PA. Suppose that we derive (2-43iii) from

(2-46) Tom_i told her_j that Ann could swim but nobody believed what he_i told her_j. (R60)

such that the string what he_i told her_j is reduced to him_i in case there are co-referential antecedent NP's. This reduction is in line with the notion of recoverability usually required under the operation of a deletion transformation. This approach will also apply to sentences like "I $_i$ told you$_j$ that... nobody believed me$_i$" (me = what I_i told you_j).

Now notice that we find perfectly good sentences like

(2-47) i) Everybody believes him today. (what he says)
ii) No one ever believes her, damnit. (what she says)
iii) Someone must have believed them. (what they say)
iv) Harry believes her through thick and thin.
v) I hereby admit to you that I believe him.
vi) I hereby acknowledge that I believe them.

in which the object of believe is a personal pronoun, certainly anaphoric, but with no antecedent in the underlying representation ála the PA. Moreover, (2-46v-vi) are themselves performative and thus not (presumably) embedded sentences.

The main force of the second argument for a higher verb of saying is summarized as

(2-48) No deep structure containing VP-be damned if S is well-formed unless the subject of this VP is identical to the subject of the first VP up the tree whose head verb has the features [+Communication, +Linguistic, +Declarative].

The claim is made that the relative acceptability for sentences like

(2-49) i) I'll / ii) *He'll } be damned if { I'll / he'll } go.

follows from the PA. (I find (2-49ii) acceptable.)

Although there is wide variation on acceptability, the following sentences, all violating the higher subject identity and/or communication verb restriction, are acceptable.

(2-50) i) I knew that you'd be damned if you'd pay up.
ii) Jones'll be damned if he'll go.
iii) The President'll be damned if he'll forego the vote.
iv) Harry probably figures I'll be damned if I'll support Nixon.
v) You'll be damned if you'll go - isn't that right?

To be sure, the subject of the VP-be damned if S is interpreted as holding the view expressed by the following embedded sentence. For example, in (2-50ii) we understand Jones to be unwilling to go. What seems to be at issue in accounting for the acceptability of non first person sentences is that the speaker have some knowledge of the subject's opinions. The following sequence lays the ground work for the final, non-I-subject-be damned if sentence.

(2-51) Jones is ready to do almost anything for me. But I admit that he'll be damned if he will wash my socks.

Thus, it appears that these be damned if cases required special knowledge of the subject's views, but do not support the claim for a higher performative verb.

The final argument in §2.2 turns on some facts of Arabic which I cannot evaluate. Moreover, I don't believe they can be considered relevant for an argument about English syntax, the direct subject of the paper.

The final section of arguments is presented to support a higher indirect object you. The first claim is that

(2-52) The deep structure subject of an idiom like hold one's breath, lose ones cool,etc. must be identical to the indirect object of the second sentence up.

Aside from the fact that practically no idioms of the form V one's N permit a passive form like hold one's breath (keep one's word is one similar case), I find most of Ross' unacceptable examples

acceptable. For example, the sentences

(2-53) i) I want Tom's breath to be held until I say "stop."
ii) Can your breath be held very long under water?
iii) I expect your word to be kept at all times.
iv) I told Max that I wanted {his / your / their} word to be kept no matter what.

are all acceptable for me but violate his restrictions. In addition, I simply don't find the restriction on the second sentence up to be accurate:

(2-54) I indicated to Harry that Mary was not fully informed that they wanted his breath to be held longer than usual.

and find that no support is provided for the PA higher <u>you</u>.

The second argument is that the subject of subjective predicates such as <u>be tired</u>, <u>be bored</u>, <u>feel angry</u> cannot be identical to the indirect object of the first verb up. Thus, sentences like

(2-55) i) *You feel tired.
ii) *You are bored.

can be automatically excluded by the PA which contains a higher indirect object <u>you</u>.

But it is clear that this restriction cannot be correct in light of sentences like

(2-56) i) I demonstrated to him that he felt tired.
ii) You told Jones that he probably feels bored.
iii) It is now possible to prove to Harry that he is tired.
iv) I heard from you that you feel happy.
v) You are depressed, aren't you?

The reason why sentences like (2-55) are not normally uttered as a simple declarative is not clear to me; it does not seem to turn on a higher indirect object <u>you</u>. Also, the sentence (2-56v) presumably has such a <u>you</u> indirect object but is perfectly acceptable.

The final argument in section 2.3 deals with ERPs, is similar to those cases discussed above, and will not be reviewed here.

In section 2.4, Ross speculates that the interpretation of the sentence (2-57i)

(2-57) i) Jenny isn't here, for I don't see her.
ii) I say that Jenny isn't here, for I don't see her.

is derived from (2-57ii), since she might very well be here. I take no issue with his interpretation of the sentence (2-57i) but don't see how it bears on the PA.

In summary, after careful examination of the syntactic evidence presented in support of the PA, I must conclude that it fails to make the case. There are just too many cases where the restrictions are either too loose or too tight or simply false. And this, coupled with the "you are hereby authorized..." cases suggests that a syntactic motivation for the PA is not going to succeed--at least not with the evidence thus far presented.

2.3 Other Arguments for the PA

In addition to the excellent paper by Ross, there are various other attempts to support the basic PA program. I will review some of them here.[6]

2.3.1

Robin Lakoff (1969) discusses a variety of sentence types in which the distribution of the indefinite quantifiers <u>some</u> and <u>any</u> cannot be predicted on the basis of syntactic environment alone. She presents examples such as

(2-58) i) If you eat {some} candy, I'll whip you. (R.L. 4a)
ii) {any}

(2-59) i) If you eat {some spinach,} I'll give you ten dollars (R.L. 4b)
ii) {any }

and argues as follows. Sentence (2-58i) is conventionally taken

to be a promise, albeit a strange one since the sentence implies that the hearer wants to be whipped; in addition, the sentence implies that the speaker wants the hearer to eat some candy. Sentence (2-58ii), on the other hand, has the opposite interpretation: the sentence is conventionally taken to be a threat or warning and implies that the hearer would not want to be whipped, and that the speaker does not want the hearer to eat any candy.

(2-59i) is usually taken as a promise with the implication that the hearer would want ten dollars and the speaker wants the hearer to eat some spinach. And the opposite with (2-59ii). The thrust of her discussion is that in sentences like (2-60), where the "Ø" is some neutral action with respect to the hearer,

(2-60) i) If you draw {some / any} pictures on the wall, I'll Ø
ii)

sentence (2-60i) is conventionally taken as a promise, while (2-60ii) is taken as a threat, by virtue of the presence of <u>some</u> in the first, <u>any</u> in the second.

R. Lakoff then goes one to remark that the sentences in (2-58) and (2-59) are related to those in (2-61) and (2-62)

(2-61) I warn you that, if you eat {any / *some} candy, I'll whip you (R.L. 5a)

(2-62) I promise you that, if you eat {some / *any} spinach, I'll give you ten dollars (R.L. 5b)

and correctly observes that, assuming normal conventions of the use of <u>warn</u> and <u>promise</u> and the normal attitudes of people towards whipping and receiving money, the *'d sentences are infelicitious. The choice of <u>some</u>/<u>any</u> corresponds to (2-58) and (2-61)/(2-59) and (2-62), and the force of these sentences are the same, although

there is no verb warn or promise appearing in the surface structure of the first two. She concludes that "it is difficult to see how this could be predicted -- how both the meaning and the syntactic properties could be accounted for together, and the generalization achieved -- without performative abstract verbs, operating in 4a (2-58) and 4b (2-59), parallel to real performative verbs in 5a (2-61) and 5b(2-62)." (p.612)

Whereas I agree completely with the observations that, in the examples presented, a some correlates with a positive disposition on the part of the speaker, an any with a negative disposition, I do not (predictably) agree with the conclusion that the performative analysis is the answer. To support this opposition, I want to consider some additional examples: first, other conditional sentences which can be taken as threats or promises; second, other examples of threats and promises.

Consider the examples in (2-63).

(2-63) i) I'll {help / whip} you if {any / some} students try that a second time.

ii) I'll {help / whip} you if they try that at {some / any} other place.

(2-64) i) If you refuse {some / any} cheese, I'll help you.

ii) If you refuse {some / *any} cheese, I'll whip you.

(2-65) If you have {any / ?some} trouble, I'll {help / whip} you.

The examples in (2-63) show that conditional threats and promises with the indefinite noun phrase in the non-object position permit both the some and any form. While there is a subtle distinction in interpretation carried by the some/any (a distinction I cannot adequately state), interchanging some for any or vice-versa does not change the force of these examples. Examples (2-64) show that

if the verb of the if-clause is refuse (leave, reject), then the some occurs with the sentence taken as a threat, and the any with the sentence taken as a promise. Finally, when the verb of the if-clause is non-volitional such as have (need, want) as in (2-65), the any appears preferable for both threats and promises. The examples in (2-64) are perhaps the most interesting in that the positive or negative disposition of the speaker is not being carried by the some and any. In (2-64i), for example, the implication is that the speaker does not want the hearer to reject some cheese, whereas the some, according to R. Lakoff's argumentation, should imply that the speaker wants the rejection.

It may be that these three sorts of counterexamples will be accounted for through some existing analysis of quantifiers and/or verbs, or some analysis under development. For example, one could (and probably will) argue that the any in (2-63) is not the same as that in (2-58) and (2-59). One could also argue that refuse verbs as in (2-64) and non-volitional verbs as in (2-65) create special environments, either syntactic or semantic, and the some/any distribution is thereby accounted for. When such analyses do appear and do account for the above facts, then we can re-examine the jump from (2-58 and (2-59) to the performative analysis conclusion. At present, all we have are some interesting cases where some and any distribute with promises and threats in the object position, of if-clauses of conditional sentences, with certain verbs.

Let us now briefly examine the distribution of some and any with promises and threats.

(2-66) i) I'll follow you {anywhere / ?somewhere}.

ii) I {promise / warn} you that I'll eat {any / *some} food before me.

iii) I'll leave {any / some} leftovers.

iv) I'll {help / whip} you before I talk to {someone / anyone}.

v) I'm going to {help / whip} someone before the night is out.

(2-66i) with the anywhere can be taken as either a threat or promise; with somewhere it is strange as either. In (2-66ii) the any goes with either the threat or promise interpretation; the some with neither. Both some and any may occur in (2-66iii) as a threat ("You're not paying me enough so I'll leave some/any leftovers which you will have to clean up") or a promise ("Since you've been so helpful, I'll leave some/any leftovers"). Similarly with (2-66iv). Finally, in (2-66v), only someone is acceptable (still the indefinite some-stress is on the verb whip or help).

The distribution of some and any does not appear to correlate in any systematic way with promises and threats, either in general or even in conditional sentences. Perhaps subsequent analysis will show that the systematicity is really there, just obfuscated by the effect of other phenomena in the examples I've presented. If so, fine. But at present, there is no real case for arguing that some and any have a syntactic reflex which correlates with a speech act type.

As an aside, it's worth noting that the some/any association with the positive/negative speaker disposition appears in a variety of other cases, and appears to distinguish between force ambiguity.

For example, (2-67i)

(2-67) i) Should you eat {the / some / any} cheese
ii)
iii)

can be taken either as a straightforward request for information (with perhaps a positive position by the speaker), answerable by yes or no, or a (polite) suggestion to stop eating the cheese. But (2-67ii) is usually taken to be only a request for information though the second interpretation is not excluded and (2-67iii) is usually taken only as a suggestion to cease eating. Analogously, in the sentence (2-68i)

(2-68) i) Can you pass {the / some / ?any} salt
ii)
iii)

may be taken as a request for information or a polite request for action -- "Please pass me the salt." (2-68iii), however, seems strange although the sentence "Can you see some/any people?" is acceptable as a request for information. We will discuss such cases in §4.

2.3.2

Additional syntactic arguments drawn from different sources are presented by G. Lakoff (1970) in section IV, Performative Verbs, in support of the PA. Although his statement of the PA differs in detail from that given by Ross, the sense is the same and I will not restate it.

The first argument concerns sentences like

(2-69) i) Egg creams, I like (L.1)
ii) John says that egg creams, he likes (L.2)
iii) *The fact that egg creams, he likes bothers John (L.3)
iv) *John dreamed that egg creams he liked (L.4)

Lakoff argues that (2-69i) is formed by a rule of topicalization and though the rule can apply to clauses which are objects of verbs of saying ("actually a somewhat larger class including verbs of saying" (page 20)), it doesn't usually apply inside subject or other sorts of object complements. He concludes that if (2-69i) has a higher I say to you at the point at which the topicalization rule applies, there can be a single environment for applicability: when the clause is the object of a verb of asking. Otherwise, "one would have to say that the rule applies either in the object of verbs of saying or in simple declarative sentences," (page 20).

The force of this argument is not that there is a syntactic phenomenon (e.g., the ERPs discussed earlier) which will be accounted for in a systematic way if the PA is adopted. Rather, a much weaker argument is being made: the statement of a transformational rule will be simplified from two to one environments of applicability. Thus, even if the argument goes through, its significance is less than those presented by Ross.

But examination of the facts suggests that the generalization Lakoff offers isn't correct. Topicalization may not occur when the clause is the object of a verb of saying, as the following sentences illustrate.

(2-70) i) *John reported that egg rolls, I gave to Mary.
ii) *I deny that ice cream, I eat for dinner.
iii) *He agreed that wheat germ, he has enough of.

(Note that the embedded object complement clause is an acceptable sentence with the topicalized NP when it stands as an independent clause.)

In addition, topicalization applies to a wide class of verbs, going well beyond verbs of saying.

(2-71) i) I expect that ice cream she likes.
ii) We know that rhubarb they can't eat.
iii) I request that all electric wires you leave alone.
iv) We guessed that even modern music he would dig.

The ground rules for this topicalization is the subject for further research. It seems clear that verbs of saying don't play a significant role.

The second argument involves sentences like

(2-72) i) Never have I seen such impudence.
ii) John said that never had he seen such impudence.
iii) *The fact that never had he seen such impudence bothered John.
iv) *John dreamed that never had he seen such impudence.

The form of the argument is the same. Lakoff claims that the rule of negative preposing [my term-he doesn't give it a name] applies in simple declaratives (2-72i), when the clause is the complement of a verb of saying (2-72ii), but not generally in other complements.

My approach here is similar to that above: to test whether verbs of saying are the significant element in the syntactic phenomenon under discussion. For these examples, I cannot find a significant number of cases where a sentence is unacceptable when an object of a verb of saying has undergone negative preposing. (Deny is one possible counterexample, as in"*I deny that never have I seen such a mess.") It appears that the clause be the object of a verb of saying, is a sufficient condition. However, the ranges of possible environments is far wider than object complements of verbs of saying.

(2-73) i) I realized that never had I seen that man before.
ii) I asked that never should he be permitted to hear it again.
iii) Harry thought that never had anyone ever evidenced such chuzhpah before.
iv) Recall that never has that been tried before.
v) Don't worry that never before did anyone succeed.

The necessary condition, that the clause be the object of a verb of saying fails.

A third argument rests on the privilege of occurrence of so with heavy stress, as in

(2-74) He did so eat the hot dog.

Examples are presented which, similarly, suggest that the so occurs only in simple declarative sentences and in the object complements of verbs of saying. But then, what about sentences like

(2-75) i) I do so claim that John is silly.
ii) I do so agree with you.
iii) I do so admit to having peeked under the Christmas tree.

in which the speaker is claiming, agreeing, or admitting by virtue of uttering the sentence. These would suggest a highest verb of saying over the performative verb. But this runs directly counter to a main claim of the PA.

Yet another argument involves sentences like

(2-76) i) Keep it to yourself (*himself, *myself, *herself).
ii) Watch your (*his, *her, *my) step.
iii) John told Mary to keep it to herself (*yourself, *himself)
iv) We told John to watch his (*her, *my) step.

in which the acceptable pronoun in (2-76i-ii) is yourself and in (2-76iii-iv) is co-referential with the indirect object of tell. But I don't see how this supports the PA. The acceptable pronominal form in the third and fourth examples follows from the fact that the underlying subject of the embedded clause, deleted during the

derivation by the rule of Equi-NP Deletion is co-referential with the indirect object of the higher verb, tell... This need not have been the case:

(2-77) John told Mary that they should watch their steps.

The first two examples follow from that part of the analysis of imperative sentences to which presumably Lakoff agrees: that you is the underlying subject. After all, there are sentences like

(2-78) i) You will keep it to yourself (*himself).
ii) You will watch your (*my, *his) step.

to be accounted for, irrespective of the merits of the PA.

Another argument asserts that sentences like

(2-79) It would be wise to wash yourself/myself (*herself, *himself).

are best explained by a higher I and you. But surely the underlying representation of (2-79) is something like

(2-80) It -- for NP to wash NP -- would be wise.

where the usual rule of reflexivization will apply to the embedded clause, followed by Extraposition.

(2-81) i) It would be wise for $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{me}\\\text{him}\end{matrix}\right\}$ to wash $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{myself.}\\\text{himself.}\end{matrix}\right\}$
ii)

The issue, then, is not the acceptability of a particular reflexive pronoun, but the conditions under which the underlying subject can be deleted. When an "It is wise..." sentence is explicitly embedded in another, higher, clause, as in (2-82)

(2-82) i) John thought that it would be wise for him)to Ø
ii) I admit that Harry will argue that it would be wise for me) to Ø [note that the I is not the subject of the next highest verb claimed necessary by Lakoff (p. 26)].

we can use the rule of Equi-Deletion, where the for NP must be co-referential with some earlier NP. But, analogous to the as for myself cases, the acceptability of the It would be wise cases depends on the context in which the sentence is uttered.

(2-83) i) Kissinger told Agnew that it would be wise [for the President] to order in the troops.
ii) John said to Mary that it would be stupid [for that group of students] to try that.

The NP enclosed in []'s is the subject of the embedded clause but is not present earlier in the sentence.

The remaining issue is how to account for the possibility of deleting the I or you functioning as the clause subject. The PA straightforwardly permits this deletion under conditions of identity. I have no adequate counter proposal but point out that NP's can be deleted in a variety of environments, in case they refer to either the speaker or the sentence or the intended audience. For example

(2-84) i) [You] go home.
ii) If the paper is completed [by me] by noon, the job's done.
iii) The job was well done [by you].
iv) That hurts [me].

An additional argument involves sentences containing parenthetical adverbial expressions (underlined) in (2-85).

(2-85) i) Why is John leaning, since you know so much.
ii) Since I'm tired, go home.
iii) John has left, in case you haven't heard.

I agree with Lakoff that in each case the adverbial clause does not modify the main clause. He suggests that they modify a highest verb ask, order and tell, respectively, above the main clause. But note that these parentheticals can go with many types of speech acts: they supply the reason for the performance of the act of

uttering the sentences (sometimes implying irony and sarcasm) as the following examples illustrate.

(2-86) i) Since you are sick, go home [ORDER]
ii) Since I was asked to, I hereby christen this ship the S.S. Mistake [CHRISTENING]
iii) Since it is raining, let's leave now [SUGGESTION]
iv) Since it is getting late, I warn you to hurry [WARNING]
v) Since I like ice cream, I will come to your party [PROMISE]

In short, the speaker may offer a variety of explanations for why he is performing a particular type of speech act, or he may simply perform the act. Whether the proferred reason fits in with the hearer's conception of an acceptable rationale is usually independent from the sentence counting as the performance of that act. (2-87i) counts as a promise and

(2-87) i) Since I'm sick, I promise I'll be there on time.
ii) Since you know so much, I christen this ship the S.S. Mistake

(2-87ii) as an act of christening, though the reasons given are difficult to appreciate without additional information. But this suggests that parenthetical statements or reason for performing a speech act are without linguistic constraint (except for some tense restrictions). They have no logical connection to the speech act, nor to any performative verb present, and do not support the PA.

A final case has been discussed in Bach (1971) and Baker (1970) as well as the Lakoff article under discussion. It concerns the interpretation of questions like

(2-88) Who remembers where John bought what books

which can have two sorts of answers:

(2-89) i) Peter (and Harry and...) remember where John bought what books.
ii) Peter remembers where John bought the green books, and Harry remembers where John bought the red books, and ...

The argument runs thus. Only one WH-word can be moved forward in a clause and if one is moved, it is preposed to follow the verb and controls it (however control should be taken to mean here). The WH preposing of examples

(2-90) i) I wonder where he went.
ii) Let's ask where he went.
iii) Where did he go?

will be accounted for by the same rule if (2-90iii) has a higher controlling verb of asking. In addition, they argue that if each WH-word is bound by a verb, the higher ask can account for the individuation sense of (2-88) to which the answer (2-89ii) is appropriate.

I don't see any way at the moment to argue that the higher verb of asking doesn't or shouldn't exist. Both direct and indirect questions are formed (roughly) in the same way, namely, by bringing forward a WH-word. By definition, indirect questions are embedded clauses; thus, there is a higher verb. The next step is, naturally, to posit a higher abstract (performative) verb to make as neat a generalization as possible.

However, it is not clear that the phenomenon of individuation in questions and the higher verb of asking are related. Consider the examples in (2-91).

(2-91) i) Who bought which books?
ii) Which books were bought by whom?
iii) Where John bought which books is known by whom?
iv) He wondered who bought which books.
v) Who wondered who bought which books?
vi) Who remembers which place John bought which books?
vii) Who knows who remembers where John bought which books?
viii) Which books does he know that Harry remembers John bought where?

In (2-91i), the individuation sense is the only acceptable inter-

pretation. Similarly for (2-91ii). But in (2-91iii), the passive of (2-88), this sense is precluded. The only answer to (2-91iii) is "...is known by John (and Mary and...)." In (2-91iv), the sense is again that of individuation but in (2-91v), the sense is otherwise. What is it that permits a verb like wonder to have the individuation sense when in the independent clause but precludes this sense in the dependent clause? A similar case is (2-91vi), where the embedded clause has the individuation sense but the entire sentence does not. Finally, example (2-91vii) shows that when (2-88), which could have individuation sense between the top who and the embedded which books is itself embedded, the individuation sense is lost between any of the possible WH-words.

An additional bit of potential counter-evidence concerns echo questions. It is crucial to the PA that the presence or absence of the highest performative verb be irrelevant to the interpretation of the sentence. But in the following examples when the performative verb remains the sentence is unacceptable. (Heavy stress on the WH-word is indicated by caps.)

(2-92) i) WHO did you say came here?
*I ask you to tell me WHO you said came here.
ii) John saw WHAT over there?
*I ask... John saw WHAT over there?

The performative PA clearly doesn't work correctly for echo questions. Whether this is because echo questions are not questions at all or are different in many other ways as well or if the PA should treat these as special cases and obligatorily delete the performative clause, I can't say.

2.4 Conclusion of PA Discussion

What, then, can we conclude from the material presented and discussed in this section? First, to my knowledge no one has suggested that there is in principle evidence which will bear on the question of whether or not the PA or something like it is a viable alternative for the task of pairing sentences with their force(s). It does appear, however, that the program detailed by Ross and supported by others is not syntactically motivated, as claimed, nor is its statement straightforward, though perhaps possible. I think it is fair to conclude that the evidence is far too weak and scattered to justify a significant theoretical innovation as the Performative Analysis.

Various linguists would argue today, however, that the Aspects framework or anything remotely resembling it is unacceptable. They maintain that there is a more acceptable alternative, namely Generative Semantics. This is not a forum for discussing the merits or demerits of either approach (or some third or fourth). I point out, however, that the PA falls easily within the Generative Semantics framework, as now conceived, and without the onus of syntactic justification. Within this framework, the issue is simply this: how are the generalizations between sentence sense and sentence force best captured?

3.0 A Meaning Approach to Conventional Use

The performative approach attempts to pair a sentence with its illocutionary force(s) by generating highest performative clauses in the underlying representation. In this section I

will present the outline of a very different approach, one in which illocutionary force is taken to be a function of sentence meaning.

3.1 General Statement

In its most general form, the approach is this. For each sentence we have a syntactic, semantic, and phonological characterization -- its grammatical description. (Whether the semantic interpretation is a function of the underlying representation alone or the entire derivation is irrelevant for our purposes.) For each type of illocutionary act we have a set of linguistic and contextual conditions which, when taken together, constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an utterance to count as the performance of that illocutionary act. This division of conditions claims that there are requirements on the performance of an illocutionary act which are characteristically carried by the sentence as such, and independent of the context in which the sentence is uttered. These conditions determine the eligibility of the utterance of the sentence to count as the performance of a particular act. The aim of this approach is to develop the principles which pair each sentence with the illocutionary force(s) conventionally associated with it, stressing particularly the role played by the linguistic conditions.

Looking first at sentences, we maintain that the illocutionary force of a sentence is a function of sentence meaning but it is not a function of the sentence form: syntactic structure or

phonological shape. Of course insofar as meaning is a function of syntactic or phonetic considerations, these aspects of a sentence are relevant. What this restriction amounts to is the claim that (i) transformations do not affect sentence force (since transformations are meaning-preserving), and (ii) optional

variation of stress and intonation as well as substitution of synonymous lexical items do not affect sentence force. This claim would be contradicted if, for example, the force(s) associated with an active sentence and its passive form is not the same or, if by replacing optometrist with eye doctor or bállet with ballét, a change of sentence force resulted.

Following Katz (1971) in spirit though not in detail, we distinguish between the propositional content of a sentence (what proposition is expressed when the sentence is uttered) and the propositional type of a sentence. For our purposes, a proposition can be thought of as a statement of sentence referents and what is predicated of them. The propositional type provides information on how the proposition is to be taken.[7] For example, in the following example,

(3-1) i) You will be here on time.
ii) Will you be here on time?
iii) Be here on time.
iv) I suggest that you be here on time.

the propositional content is the same: you will be here on time. However, in (3-1i) the propositional type is Predictive: the speaker is claiming that being on time will be true of the hearer. In (3-1ii) the propositional type is Questive: the speaker is asking if being on time will be true of the hearer. In (3-1iii) the type is Requestive; the speaker is asking that the hearer take action to be on time. And (3-1iv) has a Suggestive propositional type; the speaker is recommending to the hearer that he be here on time. The propositional type of the first three examples is carried by the syntactic form of the sentence; in the fourth, the performative verb determines the propositional

type. We will see below that the propositional type will play an important role in determination of sentence force. For the present we will assume that each performative verb is paired with one and only one propositional type. Further, we speculate that propositional types are, in general, analyzable into a combination of less complex propositional types. We will not discuss this possibility here.

Turning now to the anlaysis of illocutionary acts, we note that Searle (1969) identifies four types of conditions: Propositional Content, Preparatory, Sincerity, and Essential. However, for this discussion I find it more useful to make the distinction between linguistic and contextual conditions: the linguistic conditions are satisfied by the sentence, the contextual conditions by the context of the utterance of that sentence.

To view the range of conditions on the performance of an illocutionary act, we consider the illocutionary act of promising which, according to Searle, (ibid), requires satisfaction of at least the following conditions:

(3-2) i) The speaker expresses the proposition P in the utterance of the sentence.

ii) In expressing P, the speaker predicates a future act A of himself.

iii) The speaker intends that the utterance of the sentences will place him under the obligation to do A.

iv) The speaker intends to do A.

v) The hearer prefers the speaker's doing A to his not doing it and the speaker believes this to be the case.

vi) It is not obvious to either the speaker or hearer that the speaker will perform A in the normal course of events.

Whether or not these conditions accurately reflect the requirements on promising, they do show that some are clearly linguistic (for example (3-2i-ii)) and others are clearly contextual (for example (3-2vi)).

We will stipulate the linguistic conditions on an illocutionary act in the following way. We assume that each performative verb corresponds to one and only one illocutionary act. Abstracting away from the specific details, each sentence containing a performative verb places syntactic conditions on the embedded clause both in terms of propositional content and propositional type, and semantically entails certain propositions. We hold the linguistic conditions for an illocutionary act A to be just those syntactic conditions and semantically entailed propositions of sentences containing the performative verb corresponding to A. Sentences containing the performative verb promise, for example, have the following linguistic conditions.

(3-3) i) The speaker expresses a proposition with a future tense and an assertive propositional type.

ii) The speaker intends to act to insure the truth of the future proposition.

iii) The speaker undertakes the obligation to act to insure the truth of the future proposition.

iv) The speaker believes that his action is in the hearer's best interests.

These semantic entailments correspond roughly to conditions (3-2i-v). That each of the conditions is indeed linguistic can be shown by violating the condition and noting that the sentence ceases to be counted as a promise.

(3-4) i) *I promise that you have left

ii) I promise to help you but I don't intend to

iii) I promise to help you but I don't have to.

iv) I promise to help you though I know you don't want me to.

It is important that the semantic linguistic conditions on an illocutionary act are defined in general as semantic entailments on sentences containing the performative verb which corresponds to the act. This means that any disagreement about X being a non-syntactic linguistic condition on performing illocutionary act A is settled by determining whether X is semantically entailed by the sentence containing the performative verb A. We will see below that some linguistic conditions are more important than others.

For the purposes of examining the ways in which sentence-meaning is related to sentence force, we establish the following correspondences: Explicit; Underdetermined; and Idiomatic. We now briefly characterize each of these relationships. Of course, when a sentence has more than one force, the relationship between the sentence and each of its forces may be different.

Explicit

This type of relationship obtains when the sentence contains a performative verb. Example (3-5) illustrates such sentences.

(3-5) i) I promise to be home on time.
ii) I request you stay in bed.
iii) I confess that I broke the vase.

The pairing of the appropriate sentence force with the examples in (3-5) is trivial. The linguistic conditions on each illocutionary act are defined as the syntactic conditions on the embedded proposition and the semantic entailments of the sentence containing the performative verb associated with that act (e.g., promise-Promising; admit-Admission). Since these sentences each contain

a performative verb, they necessarily have the force of the act named by the verb. Or simply, for these cases, the force is the name of the propositional type.

In (3-5i) the future proposition which the speaker obliges himself to affect is spelled out as the embedded clause and his role is clear: the speaker must get home on time for the proposition to be true. Similarly for (3-5iii). In a sentence like (3-6i), the future proposition is certainly clear but the action to which the speaker obliges himself is not obvious.

(3-6) i) I promise that John will be home on time.
ii) I request that Mary be allowed to leave.

Similarly for (3-6ii). In such cases when the nature of the action predicated of the speaker or the hearer is not explicit, the interpretation is

(3-7) i) I promise to do what is necessary such that...
ii) I request that you do whatever is necessary such that...

For such cases we tentatively posit a rule of semantic interpretation

(3-8) Whenever the meaning of a performative verb entails the predication of some act A of referent R, and when this predication is not explicitly part of the proposition P, interpret P as "R do whatever is necessary that P."

There are three related cases. First, in sentences like

(3-9) i) I promise that I undertake the obligation to go.
ii) I confess that the foul deed was done by me.

part of the meaning of promise and confess has been made explicit in the embedded clause: the undertaking of the obligation and the admission that the deed was a foul one. We might characterize

these as cases where meaning overdetermines force or where there is meaning redundancy which is relevant to force determination. I see no difficulty in handling such cases.

The second case concerns ambiguous sentences in which one leg of the ambiguity follows from the performative use of the verb, the other from the habitual use. (3-5i), for example, can be both a promise and a report about the speaker's habitual actions; e.g. a child's answer to the question "How come you are allowed to leave just before dinner to go out and play?" There is a clear force-ambiguity in these cases which is directly reflected in the meaning-ambiguity. Most performative verbs can be used in the habitual sense.

The third related case involves sentences like

(3-10) i) I promise that I wanted to go.
ii) I confess that I will try.

where the embedded clause fails to meet the syntactic restrictions on the highest verb when used performatively. (3-10i) fails in two ways: the embedded clause is in the past thereby failing to specify some future proposition, and its verb denotes a state (wanting) rather than an action. (3-10ii) fails to have the force of a confession because the embedded clause specifies a future rather than a past proposition. The verbs promise and confess are not being used performatively, and appear to be a coding for some other performative verb. The sentence-force of (3-10i) is that of swearing; in (3-10ii) that of admitting. Whether this coding is conventional or not is open.

Underdetermined

These are cases in which sentence-meaning underdetermines sentence-force and are by far the most challenging. Sentences like

(3-11) i) I will try.
ii) Try to see.

are conventionally used to perform a range of illocutionary acts. For example, performing the act of promising, threatening, warning and predicting all require that the speaker express a proposition with a future time and an Assertive propositional type. (3-11i) does contain such a proposition and thus meets the syntactic condition of these four types of illocutionary acts. Similarly, (3-11ii) meets the syntactic linguistic condition of a Requestive propositional type and thus might count as an order, request, plea, etc. There are many similar equivalence classes which bind sets of illocutionary acts. Since there is no additional information carried by these sentences which indicates if the semantic linguistic conditions of the different acts are met, e.g., if the speaker is undertaking an obligation, that the future proposition, if true, constitutes a danger to the hearer, and so forth, we will say that, in cases such as (3-11i), the sentence has the incomplete force of a promise or a threat, etc., and for (3-11ii), the incomplete force of an order, a command, etc. Of course, (3-11i)can be USED as a promise or threat, etc.; the point here is that its force is not determined explicitly by sentence-meaning.

A second sort of underdetermined pairing involves sentences like (3-12).

(3-12) I hereby undertake the obligation to go.

which contains the performative verb undertake the obligation and has the corresponding force. But (3-12) also meets linguistic conditions (3-3) on promising except for (3-3iv). Promising and undertaking an obligation differ in that the former but not the latter requires the favorable disposition of the hearer towards the future speaker-action. (3-12) explicitly has the force of undertaking an obligation and incompletely the force of a promise.

Idiomatic

Semantic-idiomaticity arises when the meaning of a constituent is not a compositional function of the meaning of its parts (cf. Fraser, 1970). The limiting case is a single lexical item (e.g., bottle) and runs through phrases (e.g., kick the bucket) up to and including entire clauses (e.g., "The cat has got his tongue"). The possibility of a corresponding force-idiomaticity arises in case the force of a sentence is not a function of its meaning.

One potential set of examples involves expressions like

(3-13) i) Buzz off.
ii) Scram.
iii) Vamoose.
iv) I order you to leave my present location.

which have the force of a strong request (an order) to leave the location of the speaker. The examples (3-13i-iii) certainly have the same force, and, if they have any meaning, they have identical meaning to (3-13iv). Alternatively, one might argue that the examples in (3-13i-iii) have no meaning and their only interpretation is their force. However, it is possible to refer to such expressions as in

(3-14) He told me to buzz off, but I wouldn't leave.

where buzz off appears to have the meaning of to leave. These cases do not strongly support the position that there is force-idiomaticity.

A more convincing case involves why-questions. A sentence like

(3-15) Why don't you come over here?

has the force of a request for information ("Because I don't like you.") and, when the verb is volitional, the force of an invitation ("O.K., I will in a minute."). The request for information force follows directly from the sentence meaning and the linguistic conditions on requesting. But it is not obvious that invitation force follows from sentence meaning either directly or in terms of some general principles of interpretation. Lacking such principles, we treat this pairing as force-idiomatic and define a special convention:

(3-16) A sentence of the form Why don't you Ø has the proposition type Polite Request.

In short, a why don't you sentence is a request with a mitigated effect, thus an invitation. But this identification of force was only partly a function of sentence meaning; the other part was by fiat. As we learn more about the way in which sentence meaning and sentence force interact, I would anticipate many of these force-idioms to be non-idioms and to follow directly from the sentence meaning and some general principles of force interpretation.[8]

In summary, I have proposed that there are three basic ways in which a sentence can be related to its force(s). The first, the explicit, involves a performative verb which carries the sentence force. The second, the underdetermined, involves pairing an equivalence class of forces with a sentence which satisfies some but not all of the linguistic conditions. The third, the idiomatic, involves pairing a sentence with a force at least in part by fiat. We will now examine several complex cases to see how their forces might be accounted for.

3.2 Some Examples

May-questions

I will assume but not justify the assumption that there are at least three senses of may. The sentence

(3-17) John may leave now.

is ambiguous: the speaker is either expressing his opinion about a possibility of John leaving (opinion sense), giving permission for John to leave (permission sense), or reporting on the availability of John's leaving (availability sense). That the first sense of may can never occur in a may-question follows from the strangeness of requesting information on one's own opinions.

Consider sentences of the form May-NP-Ø.

(3-18)
i) May I leave now?
ii) May anyone come in now?
iii) May I have the salt?
iv) May I get you a cup of tea?

(3-18i) has the force of a request for permission; (3-18ii) the force of a request for information; (3-18iii) the force of a request for hearer's physical action; and (3-18iv) the force of making an offer. (Each of these sentences may have more than one force but we will ignore this force-ambiguity for the moment.) That the first three examples are requests of some sort is predictable from the syntactic form of the sentence; the offer force of the fourth is not immediately obvious. We first examine the conditions on a may-question which permit it to have one or more of these request forces and then observes how the fourth offer case fits in with the others.

I can find only one restriction on a may-question which prevents it from having the force of a request for permission: the surface structure subject may not be you. The following examples illustrate this.

(3-19) May i) I go?
ii) I be exempted from the exam?
iii) John leave?
iv) *you go?

This exception may or may not follow from the syntactic analysis given to the modal may with the permissive sense. The explanation would appear to lie, however, in the strangeness of someone giving himself permission to do something. I suppose that if one finds "Do you permit yourself to go" acceptable, then (3-19iv) will also be acceptable. I find them both strange.

Sentences like

(3-20) i) May anyone come in?
ii) May I leave now?
iii) May you do that at this point?

have the force of a request for information *about* permission. The hearer is being asked if he has any information which indicates that the action being questioned is not permissible. An appropriate answer to the examples in (3-20) is "As far as I know." I can find no restrictions on a *may*-question which will block it from having the force of a request for information about permission. Note that even the *may you* sequences are acceptable here. If we are correct in assuming that *may* has both a permissive and an availability sense, the pairing of each of these forces with a *may*-question is directly a function of the meaning; a question like (3-20ii) is semantically ambiguous.

In contrast to these first two types, the possibility of a *may*-question having the force of a request for action is quite limited. As a first approximation, I offer the following conditions:

(3-21) A *may*-question has the force of a request for action if

i) the surface structure subject is first person (*I*, *we*)
and ii) the verb is "receptive" or the sentence is in the passive form.

The term "receptive" denotes a verb which describes an action or state in which the subject receives the effect of the action: for example, *have*, *receive*, *obtain*, *hold*, *smell*, *feel*, *try*, and so forth. I don't know if this group forms any natural syntactic or semantic class. The following examples are sentences with a request for action force.

(3-22)
i) May I hold the baby?
ii) May I have the salt?
iii) May we hear the radio now?
iv) May I be escorted into the room?

I take the may in these examples to have the permissive sense and do not take the sentences as semantically ambiguous. Yet each is standardly used to perform both the illocutionary act of requesting permission and requesting action. (3-22i), for example, can count as a request for the hearer to give the baby to the speaker. But there is nothing in the meaning of this sentence which involves "giving" or any other related action.

One approach is to treat this pairing as an idiom and define the following special convention:

(3-23) A may-question with a first person subject and a [+Receptive] main verb or passive form has the force of a request for hearer action.

The hearer action is unspecified in the receptive verb case: it is (cf. 3-8) whatever is necessary to bring about the state requested by the speaker. The action in the passive case is whatever is specified by the verb. But I find this approach unsatisfactory since it assumes that there is nothing systematic about the pairing.

Alternatively, we can argue in the following way.

(3-24)

i) Linguistic conditions on a request for permission include the speaker predicating a future act of someone other than the hearer and the speaker indicating a desire for this act to be carried out.

ii) Linguistic conditions on a request for hearer action include the speaker predicating a future act of the hearer and the speaker indicating a desire for the act to be carried out.

iii) In questions with permissive-may in which the verb is receptive or the sentence has the passive form, the speaker makes a request for permission for something to happen to himself, e.g., hold the baby, obtain the salt, etc.

iv) The hearer of the utterance of such a sentence can reasonably infer that since the speaker has requested something happen to him and indicated a desire for this to happen to him, that the speaker would approve of the hearer doing whatever is necessary to carry out the act.

Statements (3-24 i-iii) lie within the domain of the meaning of the sentence. Statement (3-24iv) specifies a way in which this meaning and some theory of conversation interact. Perhaps such a theory of conversation (c.f. Grice, 1968) should be included as a part of linguistic competence and thus a part of the grammar. We will not explore this issue here.

That may-questions have the force of an offer might be accounted for by a special convention:

(3-25) A may-question which has a first person subject, second person object and which is in the active form with a volitional verb has the force of an offer.

But again, this assumes no systematicity of the pairing. Alternatively we can argue

(3-26) i) Same as (3-24i)

ii) Linguistic conditions on an offer include the speaker predicating a future act of himself which (act) affects the hearer, and the speaker indicating a willingness to carry out the act.

iii) In questions with permissive-may in which the speaker is the subject and the object of the volitional verb is either the hearer (you) or someone associated with the hearer (your wife), the speaker makes a request for permission to carry out some act that affects the hearer.

iv) Sentences as characterized in (iii) above appear to satisfy the linguistic conditions on an offer as stated in (ii) above.

Thus, it appears that the force of an offer which is paired with certain may-questions (cf. 3-25) follows directly from the meaning

of these sentences and the linguistic conditions on the illocutionary act of offering. The following sentences all have the force of an offer.

(3-27) i) May I find you a better basket.
ii) May we take your coat.
iii) May I bring your wife home tonight.
iv) May I belt you in the mouth.

Note that (3-27iv) counts as an offer, albeit one that is not likely to be taken up.

To summarize the discussion of <u>may</u>-questions, we have noted that when the <u>may</u> has the availability sense, the question has the force of a request for information about permission. When the <u>may</u> has the permissive sense, the sentence always has the force of a request for permission (except where the surface structure subject is <u>you</u>), and may have the force of a request for hearer action or an offer. The request for hearer action force does not appear to follow completely from the meaning of the sentence and linguistic conditions on the illocutionary act of requesting, while the offer force does appear to follow.

<u>Pseudo Conditionals</u>

Consider the sentences in (3-28).

(3-28) i) If you take the box -- then
ii) Take the box -- and
iii) Don't take the box -- or
} I'll Ø you.

These three examples appear semantically synonymous and a good case can be made for deriving the second and third from the first. The forces of the three, however, are not the same. (3-28i) has the force of a threat, a warning, a promise, and a prediction.

Similarly for (3-28ii). But (3-28iii) can not have the force of a promise. No matter what Ø is taken as, sentences like (3-29) do not conventionally count as promises.

(3-29) i) Don't take the box or I give you $1000.
ii) Don't talk or I'll help you.
iii) Don't deny it or I'll get you loose.

That (3-28) has at least the four forces of a threat, warning, promise and prediction follows from the meaning of the main clause of the sentences. That (3-28iii) cannot be a promise may follow from the meaning of not plus or, but I have no adequate analysis. Even if this is the case, it does not necessarily mean that the sentences in (3-28) are not synonymous -- the not...or may be taken as equivalent to ...and..., and if...then...[9]

Can-questions

Can-questions, like may-questions, exhibit a variety of forces, which derive only partly from the multiple sense of can. Let us assume that can has both a sense of permission and a sense of ability, and consider the sentences in (3-30)

(3-30) i) Can I talk to John?
ii) Can you see the boat?
iii) Can John go home?
iv) Can you pass me the salt?

(3-30i) has the force of a request for permission (the permissive sense of can) but not of a request for information, since in general one cannot question his own ability. (3-30ii) has the force of a request for information (the ability sense) but not permission since in general one does not give himself permission. (3-30iii) has both forces. These facts follow from the co-occurrence restrictions of subject noun phrases with the two senses

of can. The determination of sentence force in (3-30i-iii) follows directly from sentence meaning and the linguistic conditions on the two illocutionary acts of requesting permission and requesting information. (3-30iv), however, has both the force of a request for information and a request for action, analogous to "May I have the salt?" This particular duality of sentence force has been noticed and commented on informally by nearly everyone interested in the area of illocutionary acts with the predictable lack of agreement. One reasonable line of argument runs along the following lines:

(3-31) i) A linguistic condition on the act of requesting includes the speaker indicating that he believes that the hearer be able to carry out the act specified (The sentence "I request you come here but I know you can't" is semantically contradictory.)

ii) A can-question in the active form in which the subject is you, and the verb volitional, requests information about whether or not the hearer has the ability to perform some act.

iii) If a sentence like ( ) is uttered in a context in which the speaker and hearer both know that the hearer has the ability to carry out the act, then the request for information force is obviously not what was intended by the speaker. If not a request for information, then what?... A request for action.

Statements (3-31i-ii) deal with sentence meaning and the linguistic conditions on the act of requesting. Statement (3-31iii) is well outside this area and in some theory of conversation. One might argue that this determination of force is not so indirect by claiming that, in general, when one of the linguistic conditions of an illocutionary act is questioned, the force is that of the act itself. But the relationship is surely not so straightforward. First, the speakers of sentences like

(3-32) i) Is it possible for you to pass the salt
ii) Are you able to pass the salt
iii) Is it within your ability to pass the salt

are all asking about the hearer's ability to pass the salt. But whereas (3-30iv) is a simple request for action, however it is to be determined, the sentences in (3-32) all carry with them some sense of impatience or sarcasm. Second, sentences like

(3-33) i) Can you bring me the paint
ii) Can you move your car
iii) Can you find your own seat

do not have the force of a request for action, standardly, unless the context in which they are uttered erases the request for information force from consideration. For example, these sentences would normally have only the request for information force in a telephone conversation. It appears that to account for the request for action force of such sentences indeed requires assumptions about the context in which they are uttered. This, of course, is not the case for sentences in which the meaning more fully determines force.

Illocutionary Force Anaphora

As a final example, consider the sentences in (3-34).

(3-34) John said that he would go but I didn't believe his

i) promise
ii) *admission

What we have here is the name of the illocutionary act (promise and admission) referring back to what John is reported to have said. The grammar must account for the fact that what the speaker reports John to have said does not satisfy the linguistic requirements for conventionally making an admission but does, at least

minimally, satisfy those for making a promise. If the underlying representation for (3-34) contains the proposition "I will go" with the "I" referring to John and the propositional type is Assertive, then, in line with the previous discussion, the acceptability of (3-34i) but not (3-34ii) might well be straightforward. But this remains to be seen.

4. Conclusion

The main point of the paper has been to bring into sharper focus the issue of the way in which a grammar must account for the speaker's knowledge of sentence force as opposed to sentence form or meaning and the way in which this force is related to a sentence. The Performative Analysis, if correct, would provide a neat account of sentence force. All sentences would have the general form: Illocutionary Force Indicator-Propositional Content, where the illocutionary force indicator would be the highest performative clause. Unfortunately, this theoretical suggestion runs afoul of a variety of counterevidence and must be rejected, at least on the basis of available support. Alternatively I suggested an approach by which sentence force is a function of sentence meaning, analogous to the work in semantics to show sentence meaning to be a function of constituent meaning and sentence form. I suggested that there were at least three types of relationships between sentence meaning and sentence force (explicit; underdetermined; and idiomatic) and discussed some examples of each.

I think the best conclusion to draw from all of this is that

we have barely begun to understand the correspondence between sentences and illocutionary acts. We don't know what aspects of sentence meaning are most relevant, just how general is the function which maps sentences onto forces, to what extent illocutionary acts can be said to have disjunct sets of linguistic conditions, or to what extent a theory of conversation interacts with a determination of conventional force and if such a theory should be included as part of the grammar. These, and other questions, await investigation.

Notes

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2. I will use terms such as illocutionary force, illocutionary act, speech act and performative verb in the sense of Searle, 1969. As an aid to exposition, I will frequently use force for illocutionary force and speak of sentences having a force rather than a potential force. Finally, I will use the phrase "performative verb" as a shorthand for "a verb which is being used performatively in the sentence."

3. While it is possible to have a single sentence force with disjunct parts

i) I order you to sit down or go home.

it is not possible to have a conjoined sentence with or in which each conjunct has a distinct force

ii) I order you to stop or I promise to go home.
iii) I admit I did it or I christen this ship the S.S. Flub.

4. Steve Anderson independently noticed many of the following syntactic counterexamples and presented them in an unpublished paper "On the Performative/Constative Distinction."

5. Ross doesn't refer to the pronouns under consideration as ERP's but only as reflexives or reflexive pronouns. However, there are clearly a number of ways in which these pronouns are of a different sort from the pronouns in sentences like "John shot himself" or "I pride myself in being punctual." For example

a) They always carry some stress, though not always emphatic.

b) They occur in embedded clauses -- the point of Ross' arguments.

c) They do not abide by the Crossover Principle.

i) It wasn't only John and himself that he awarded a prize to.

ii) My feet have been washed by only Mary and myself.

6. There are various unpublished arguments intended to support the PA. I will not review them here.

7. Searle (1969) distinguishes between a propositional indicator and an illocutionary force indicator and uses as an example the sentence "I promise that I will come" in which the difference between the indicator of illocutionary force ("I promise") and the indicator of propositional content ("that I will come") lies right on the surface. However, for many sentences the term "illocutionary force indicator" is misleading whereas the term "propositional type" is less so.

8. There is always the danger that sentence-force pairings will be treated as idiomatic when, in fact, they follow from general

principles. On the other hand, this category can be thought of as the reservoir of unsolved pairings -- the task is to reduce cases of force-idiomaticity to a minimum.

9. These examples may constitute counterevidence to the claim that transformations do not change force. Note also that passive sentences with I subject can be requests for actions ("May I be included on this list") while the corresponding active form does not have this force ("May you include me on this list"). However, the two cases with may don't mean the same thing and perhaps the passive transformation is obligatory here. Or perhaps will and may have some relationship as in the pair: "Will you include me" -- "May I be included."

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